Abstract-The key-leakage-storage capacity regions for a hidden identifier's noisy measurements at two terminals of a secrecy system are derived. The capacity regions of binary sources with multiple measurements are obtained by applying Mrs. Gerber's lemma twice in different directions to a Markov chain to show gains in privacy-leakage as compared to assuming a noise-free identifier at the encoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric or physical identifiers with unique features can be used to authenticate or identify a user, or to generate secret keys for cryptographic systems. We study informationtheoretic limits for using such identifiers. We consider the model introduced in [1] and [2] where two terminals observe dependent random variables and an eavesdropper observes public messages. The model has two variants. For the generated-secret model an encoder extracts a secret-key from the source, while for the chosen-secret model a secret key is embedded into the message. We consider one-round secret-key agreement, where public communication is limited to a single message called helper data.
The secret-key vs. privacy-leakage, or key-leakage, capacity regions for the two models are given in [3] and [4] . The storage rate is equal to the privacy-leakage rate for the generated-secret model. The two rates are different for general secrecy-leakage levels [5] unlike for the negligible secrecy-leakage rate in [3] and [4] . Gains in the achievable key-leakage rates are shown in [6] when there are multiple noisy measurements of the source at the decoder.
The above models assume that the encoder measures the "true" source. We propose that this is not the case in general. Instead, the "true" source is hidden from the encoder, i.e., the encoder measures a noisy version of the source (see also [7] where the same idea is used for authentication problems). We derive the key-leakage-storage capacity regions for this model and show that the rates improve by designing a code for the "true" model rather than the "false" one. In particular, we evaluate the capacity region for multiple measurements of a binary source by applying Mrs. Gerber's lemma (MGL) [8] twice in different directions of a Markov chain. This differs from the analysis in [3] and [6] , where MGL is used once. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe our model and develop the capacity regions for the generatedand chosen-secret models. The key-leakage-storage capacity region of a binary source with multiple measurements at the decoder is derived in Section III. In Section IV, we illustrate the gains when using the true model and the maximum secret-key rates achieved by multiple encoder and decoder measurements. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND CAPACITY REGIONS

A. Notation
Upper case letters represent random variables and lower case letters their realizations. Superscripts denote a string of variables, e.g., X N = X 1 . . . X i . . . X N , and subscripts denote the position of a variable in a string. A random variable X has probability distribution Q X or P X . Calligraphic letters such as X denote sets; their sizes are written as |X | and their complements are denoted as X c . T N ǫ (Q X ) denotes the set of length-N letter-typical sequences with respect to the probability distribution Q X and the positive number ǫ [9, Ch. 3], [10] . The * -operator is defined as p * x= p(1−x)+(1−p)x. Unif [1 : N ] denotes the uniform distribution over the integers 1, 2, . . . , N .
B. System Models
Consider a discrete memoryless source (DMS) that generates independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) symbols X N from a finite set X according to the probability distribution Q X . The outputs of the memoryless channels P X|X and P Y |X are, respectively, the strings X N with realizations from a finite set X N and Y N with realizations from a finite set Y N . We thus have
In the generated-secret model depicted in Fig. 1 , an encoder sees X N and generates a secret key S and helper data M as (S, M ) = Enc 1 ( X N ), where Enc 1 is an encoder mapping. The decoder estimates the key asŜ = Dec 1 (Y N , M ), where Dec 1 is a decoder mapping. In the chosen-secret model shown in Fig. 2 , S is independent of (X N , X N , Y N ) and an encoder mapping Enc 2 generates helper data as M = Enc 2 ( X N , S). The decoder estimates the key asŜ = Dec 2 (Y N , M ), where Dec 2 is a decoder mapping.
A (secret-key, privacy-leakage, storage) rate triple (R s , R l , R m ) is achievable if, given any ǫ > 0, there is some N ≥ 1 and an encoder and decoder for which
The generated-secret model. and
The capacity region is the set of achievable rates. We later refer to models where X N determines X N as visible source models (VSMs) and all other cases as hidden source models (HSMs).
C. Key-leakage-storage Capacity Regions
We present the key-leakage-storage capacity regions for the generated-and chosen-secret models in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. The proofs for the theorems are given in Appendices A-C. We prove cardinality bounds for the auxiliary random variable in Appendix D and the convexity of the rate regions in Appendix E.
Theorem 1.
The key-leakage-storage capacity region for the generated-secret model is
where
Theorem 2. The key-leakage-storage capacity region for the chosen-secret model is
The chosen-secret model.
Remark.
The Markov conditions in (7b) and (8b) state that U − X − X − Y forms a Markov chain. One may restrict the cardinality of U to |U| ≤ |X | + 2 for both theorems. The rate regions R 1 and R 2 are convex.
Note that the maximum achievable secret-key rate I( X; Y ) in these regions is at most I(X; Y ), which is the maximum achievable secret-key rate if the identifier X N is observed noise-free at the encoder [3] , [4] .
III. NOISY MEASUREMENTS FROM BSCS
We evaluate the capacity regions for binary sources. Suppose the encoder and the decoder see X N and Y
N , respectively. The binary random sequence X N corresponds to a single measurement of the binary source X N , where the inverse channel P X| X is a BSC and X N need not be uniform. The random sequence Y N 1:MD is the output of M D measurements of the same source for M D ≥ 1 and the channel P Y1:M D |X can be decomposed into a mixture of BSCs as described in [6] . Evaluating the key-leakagestorage capacity regions requires maximizing I(U ; Y 1:MD ) and minimizing I(U ; X) for a fixed I(U ; X).
We review the results from [6] .
where 
where H Privacy-leakage Rate (bits/source-bit) Storage Rate (bits/source-bit) Proof: Consider the boundary points of R 1
Using (12) and MGL we obtain
By choosing P U| X such that P X|U is a BSC with crossover probabilityx
we achieve the right-hand sides of (14)- (16) . The proof for R 2 is similar.
IV. EXAMPLES
We study the generated-secret model with a binary symmetric source (BSS) such that Q X (x) = 0.5 for x ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose P X|X is a BSC with crossover probability p E and P Y1:M D |X consists of M D independent BSCs with crossover probability p D . The inverse channel P X| X is also a BSC with crossover probability p E due to the source symmetry. We first illustrate that the best code design when the hidden source model (HSM) is treated as if it were a visible source model (VSM) gives pessimistic privacy-leakage rate results for any M D and over-optimistic secret-key and storage rate results for
Consider the crossover probabilities p E ∈ {0.03, 0.10}, which are realistic values for biometric [3] and physical identifiers [13] . We fix the crossover probability of P Yi|X for i = 1, 2, . . . , M D to p D = 0.10. For the VSM, X N is mistakenly considered to be a noise-free source, i.e., p E is assumed to be 0, and the decoder-input channel P Y1:M D | X is assumed to consist of M D independent BSCs that are assumed to have crossover probability p E * p D . Recall that in the HSM there are independent measurements of the source at the encoder and decoder, which results in a conditional probability distribution
The projections of the boundary triples (R s , R l , R m ) onto the (R l , R m )-plane for the HSM and VSM are depicted in Fig. 3 , and Fig. 4 shows the projections onto the (R l , R s )-plane for different crossover probabilities at the encoder and different number of measurements at the decoder. At the highest leakage-storage (R * l , R * m ) point in Fig. 3 , one achieves the maximum secret-key rate R * s that corresponds to the highest point in Fig. 4 . Fig. 3 shows that for the VSM, the privacy-leakage and storage rates are equal, which are also equal to the storagerate for the HSM if M D = 1. Consider the points (R * s , R * l , R * m ) at the ends of the curves in Fig. 3 and Privacy-leakage Rate (bits/source-bit) Storage Rate (bits/source-bit) for the HSM is greater than for the VSM. The VSM thus gives pessimistic privacy-leakage rate results. Fig. 4 shows that increasing the number of measurements at the decoder increases the maximum secret key rate R * s for the HSM and VSM. R * s for the HSM and VSM are equal if M D = 1, but it is about 14% greater for the VSM than for the HSM if M D = 3, p E = 0.03, and p D = 0.10. The VSM thus gives over-optimistic secret-key and storage rate results for M D > 1. Thus, designing a code for the wrong model can lead to substantial secrecy leakage. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show that increasing p E decreases R * s and R * l , and increases R * m for the HSM. For instance, if we increase the crossover probability from p E = 0.03 to p E = 0.10 for (p D = 0.10, M D = 1), we observe that R * s and R * l decrease, respectively, by about 30% and 39% when R * m increases by about 26%. More reliable encoder-input channels thus achieve better rate triples. One can, however, consider correlated measurements at the encoder and decoder unlike the independence assumption in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . An unreliable channel at the encoder might be desirable for this case if the decoder-input is unreliable since correlations might allow less storage and leakage, and greater secret-key rates.
N of the hidden source X N at the encoder for the generated-secret model with the HSM. Suppose each encoder-input channel P Xi|X for i = 1, 2, . . . , M E is an independent BSC with crossover probability p E . The maximumsecret key rate R * s is obtained by choosing U = X 1:ME . We thus plot the projections of the (R * s , R * l , R * m ) points onto the (R l , R m )-and (R l , R s )-planes in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , respectively, for different number of encoder and decoder measurements with p D = 0.10. Fig. 5 shows that storage rates for multiple encoder measurements can be greater than 1 bit/source-bit, which cannot be the case for a single encoder measurement. Consider, for instance, the case Privacy-leakage Rate (bits/source-bit) Secret-key Rate (bits/source-bit) . If we increase the number of encoder measurements from M E = 1 to 3, then R * s , R * l , and R * m increase by about 20%, 36%, and 145%, respectively. Increasing the number M E of encoder measurements to increase the secret-key rate can thus come at a large cost of storage.
V. CONCLUSION
We derived the key-leakage-storage capacity regions for a hidden source model. For a BSS, we used MGL to evaluate the capacity regions and showed that multiple measurements at the decoder improve rates as compared to a single measurement. The privacy-leakage rates are pessimistic, whereas the secretkey and storage rates are optimistic if one mistakenly uses the visible-source model when the source is hidden. The points that achieve the maximum secret-key rates in the capacity regions for multiple encoder measurements show that increasing the secret-key rate can result in significantly greater storage rates.
Examples illustrated that improved reliability in the encoder measurements enlarge the capacity region. In future work, we will consider capacity regions for correlated measurements at the encoder and decoder, and try to show that reduced reliability in the measurements might increase the capacity region. 
A. Overview
We first provide a quick overview of the coding method before presenting the proof details. We choose the conditional probabilities P U| X (u|x) for all u ∈ U andx ∈ X . We then ran- 
B. Proof
Random Code: Fix P U| X . Randomly and independently generate codewords u N (m, s), m = 1, . . . , 2 N Rm , s = 1, . . . , 2 N Rs according to
, where
These codewords define the codebook
and we denote the random codebook bỹ
Let 0 < ǫ ′ < ǫ. Encoding: Givenx N , the encoder looks for a codeword that is jointly typical withx
If there is no such codeword or more than one such codeword, it sets m = s = 1. The encoder publicly stores the label m.
Decoding: The decoder puts outŝ if there is a unique key labelŝ that satisfies the typicality check (u N (m,ŝ), y N ) ∈ T N ǫ (P UY ); otherwise, it setsŝ = 1.
Error Probability: Define the error event
and the events
Using the union bound we have
Pr[E 1 ] is small with large N if
where δ(ǫ ′ ) → 0 as ǫ ′ → 0 (see [14, Lemma 3.3] ).
Note that the event { X N =x 
By [14, Lemma 3.1], we have
where δ(ǫ) → 0 as ǫ → 0. We define δ 1 , δ 2 , where δ 2 > δ(ǫ) and δ 1 > δ(ǫ ′ )+δ 2 , that tend to zero as ǫ → 0 and some δ > 0 that tends to zero as N → ∞ and ǫ → 0 such that
We first establish bounds for the secrecy-leakage, secret-key, privacy-leakage, and storage rates averaged over the random codebookC, then we show that there exists a codebook satisfying (2)-(6).
Secrecy-leakage Rate: In the following,
where (a) follows because, given the codebook, M S determines U N , (b) follows because X N is independent of the codebook, (c) follows by using similar steps as in [14, Lemma 22.3] for N → ∞ and δ ǫ → 0 as ǫ → 0, (d) follows by (25) and (26).
Using (27) we obtain
which tends to zero as N → ∞ and ǫ → 0. Key Uniformity: We have
where (a) follows by (27).
Privacy-leakage Rate: First consider
follows from Fano's inequality, (e) follows by using |S| ≤ | X | N and defining a parameter δ ′ that tends to zero as N → ∞ and ǫ → 0, (f ) follows by using similar steps as in [14, Lemma 22.3] for N → ∞ and δ
where (a) follows by the Markov chain U − X −X, and (b) follows by (25).
These results show that there exists a codebook that achieves for the generated-secret model the key-leakage-storage triple
APPENDIX B CODING FOR THEOREM 2 A. Overview
We use the achievability proof of the generated-secret model in combination with a one-time pad to conceal the embedded secret key S by the key S ′ generated by the generatedsecret model. The embedded key S is uniformly distributed and independent of other random variables. The secret-key and privacy-leakage rates do not change, but the storage rate I(U ; X) is roughly the sum of the storage and secret-key rates of the generated-secret model.
B. Proof
Suppose S has the same cardinality as S ′ , i.e., |S| = |S ′ |. We use the codebook, encoder, and decoder of the generated-secret model and add the masking layer (one-time pad) approach of [1] , [3] , [15] for the chosen-secret model as follows:
where the addition and subtraction operations are modulo-|S|. Error Probability: We have
which is small by (24).
Secrecy-leakage Rate:
The helper data M of the chosensecret model consists of S ′ +S and the helper data M ′ of the generated-secret model. We thus have
where (a), (b), and (c) follow because S is independent of S ′ M ′C and uniformly distributed, and (d) follows by (29) and (28). We thus have a secrecy-leakage rate that tends to zero as N → ∞ and ǫ → 0.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We have
where (a) follows since S ′ + S is independent of M ′ X NC , and (b) follows by (31).
Storage Rate: We obtain
where (a) follows because S ′ +S is independent of M ′C , and (b) follows by (25) and (26).
There thus exists a codebook for the chosen-secret model that achieves the key-leakage-storage triple
APPENDIX C CONVERSES
The converses are based on the steps in [3] . See also [1] , [4] , and [16] .
A. Converse for Theorem 1
Suppose that for some ǫ > 0 and N there is an encoder and a decoder such that (2)- (6) are satisfied for the generated-secret model by the key-leakage-storage triple (R s , R l , R m ). Fano's inequality for S andŜ gives
We use (40) to bound the secret-key, privacy-leakage, and storage rates.
Secret-key rate:
We have
where (a) follows by (5) 
because P Y |X is a memoryless channel. so that U − X −X −Y forms a Markov chain. Using (41) we obtain
Storage rate: Consider
where (45a) follows by (42), and (45b) by
since P X|X is a memoryless channel. Using the definition of U above, we obtain
Privacy-leakage rate: Observe that
where (a) follows by (4), (b) follows by (40), and (c) follows by (45a). Using the definition of U above, we have
The converse for Theorem 1 follows by (43), (47), and (49), and by letting ǫ → 0.
B. Converse for Theorem 2
Suppose that for some ǫ > 0 and N there is an encoder and a decoder such that (2)-(6) are satisfied for the chosen-secret model by the key-leakage-storage triple (R s , R l , R m ).
Secret-key rate: We obtain
where (a) follows by (5), (b) follows by (40) and (3), and (c) follows from the same steps as in (42). Using the definition of U given in the converse for Theorem 1, we obtain
Storage rate: We have
where (a) follows by (6), (b) follows because S is independent of X N and X N S determines M , and (c) follows by applying the same steps as in (46) . Using the definition of U above, we have
Privacy-leakage rate: Consider N (R l +ǫ) 
where (a) follows by (4), and (b) follows by (50) that gives an upper bound on H(S). Using the definition of U above, we obtain R l ≥ I(U ; X)−I(U ; Y )−(2ǫ+ǫ N ).
The converse for Theorem 2 follows by (51), (53), and (55), and by letting ǫ → 0.
APPENDIX D CARDINALITY BOUND FOR THE AUXILIARY RANDOM VARIABLE Consider X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . ,x |X | } and the following |X |+2 real-valued continuous functions on the connected compact subset P of all probability distributions on X : [18] and [19] , we find that there is a random variable U ′ taking at most |X | + 2 values such that Q X , H(X), H(X|U ), H( X|U ), and H(Y |U ) are preserved if we replace U with U ′ . Since P X (x) = x∈X P X|X (x|x)Q X (x) and P Y (y) = x∈X P Y |X (y|x)Q X (x) the entropies H( X) and H(Y ) are also preserved. Hence, the expressions APPENDIX E CONVEXITY OF R 1 AND R 2 Consider the rate region R 1 and two random variables U 1 and U 2 such that U q − X−X−Y forms a Markov chain for q = 1, 2. Define two key-leakage-storage triples (R s1 , R l1 , R m1 ) and (R s2 , R l2 , R m2 ) such that for q = 1, 2 R sq ≤ I(U q ; Y ) R lq ≥ I(U q ; X) − I(U q ; Y ) R mq ≥ I(U q ; X) − I(U q ; Y )
so (R sq , R lq , R mq ) ∈ R 1 . Let Q be a random variable that is independent of other random variables with P Q (1) = α and P Q (2) =ᾱ, whereᾱ = 1−α and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Define U = (U Q , Q) and the rates R s = αR s1 +ᾱR s2 R l = αR l1 +ᾱR l2 R m = αR m1 +ᾱR m2 . 
Observe that U − X−X−Y forms a Markov chain. We hence have (R s , R l , R m ) ∈ R 1 for all α ∈ [0, 1] so that the rate region R 1 is convex. The proof of the convexity of R 2 follows similarly.
